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Despite extensive evidence confirming the negative consequences of self-objectification, direct experi-
mental evidence concerning its environmental antecedents is scarce. Incidental exposure to sexist cues
was employed in 3 experiments to investigate its effect on self-objectification variables. Consistent with
system justification theory, exposure to benevolent and complementary forms of sexism, but not hostile
or no sexism, increased state self-objectification, self-surveillance, and body shame among women but
not men in Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, we replicated these effects and demonstrated that they are
specific to self-objectification and not due to a more general self-focus. In addition, following exposure
to benevolent sexism only, women planned more future behaviors pertaining to appearance management
than did men; this effect was mediated by self-surveillance and body shame. Experiment 3 revealed that
the need to avoid closure might afford women some protection against self-objectification in the context
of sexist ideology.
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Taught from infancy that beauty is women’s sceptre, the mind shapes
itself to the body, and roaming round its gilt cage, only seeks to adorn
its prison. —Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of
Woman: With Strictures on Political and Moral Subjects
Awareness of oneself as a social object is a distinct component
of being human (Cooley, 1902/1964; Duval & Wicklund, 1972;
James, 1890/1981, Vol. 1, Chapter 10; Mead, 1934). According to
Cooley (1902/1964), “we perceive in another’s mind some thought
of our appearance, manners, aims, deeds, character, friends, and so
on” (p. 184). Yet, scholars have also documented that taking such
an external observational standpoint on the self can have signifi-
cant psychological and social costs when people come to view
themselves predominantly through an objectified social lens (e.g.,
Allport, 1954; Bartky, 1990; Deaux & Major, 1987; de Beauvoir,
1952; Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997; Gibbons, 1990; Jost & Ham-
ilton, 2005). Of particular interest in the present research is the
cultural milieu that encourages girls and women to adopt an
objectified perspective on their bodies, so that eventually they
view and “treat themselves as objects to be looked at and evalu-
ated” (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997, p. 177, emphasis in original).
This process is referred to as self-objectification, and it may
represent yet another way in which members of disadvantaged
groups internalize harmful beliefs about themselves, thereby per-
petuating their own state of disadvantage (e.g., Jost, 1995; Jost,
Banaji, & Nosek, 2004).
The Process of Self-Objectification
Studies have documented that girls and women are targets of
sexual objectification more often than boys and men (for review
see Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997). Sexual objectification is a
ubiquitous phenomenon whereby women are reduced to the status
of “mere instruments” insofar as sexualized evaluations of women
separate a woman’s body, body parts, and sexual functions from
her personal identity and mental life (Bartky, 1990; Kaschak,
1992). The sexualized way in which women’s bodies are evaluated
within Westernized cultural contexts has both personal and polit-
ical implications for women’s lives. According to objectification
theory (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997), regular encounters of sex-
ual objectification coax women into taking a third-person (e.g.,
“How do I look?”) versus first-person (e.g., “How do I feel?”)
self-perspective, such that they come to view themselves through
this objectified social lens (self-objectification). The chronic self-
surveillance that accompanies this self-perspective reflects the
extent to which women come to “police” or monitor their physical
appearance from such an external observational standpoint
(Berger, 1972; de Beauvoir, 1952; McKinley & Hyde, 1996).
More than a decade of research on objectification theory has
documented the significant costs of self-objectification to wom-
en’s subjective well-being (Breines, Crocker, & Garcia, 2008;
Mercurio & Landry, 2008) and cognitive performance (Fredrick-
son, Roberts, Noll, Quinn, & Twenge, 1998; Quinn, Kallen,
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Twenge, & Fredrickson, 2006). It is also associated with greater
fear and perceived risk of rape (Fairchild & Rudman, 2008),
greater hostility toward other women (Loya, Cowan, & Walters,
2006), greater likelihood of self-harm (Muehlenkamp, Swanson, &
Brausch, 2005), stronger endorsement of cosmetic surgery (Cal-
ogero, Pina, Park, & Rahemtulla, 2010), and a disproportionately
higher rate of mental health risks, including depression (Grabe,
Hyde, & Lindberg, 2007; Tiggemann & Kuring, 2004), disordered
eating (Calogero, Davis, & Thompson, 2005; Tylka & Hill, 2004),
and sexual dysfunction (Calogero & Thompson, 2009; Steer &
Tiggemann, 2008). In particular, researchers have consistently
identified body shame as a negative emotional consequence of
self-objectification (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997; McKinley &
Hyde, 1996; Moradi & Huang, 2008)—and body shame mediates
the deleterious effects of self-objectification on well-being and
mental health (Calogero, 2009; Noll & Fredrickson, 1998; Quinn,
Kallen, & Cathey, 2006; Tiggemann & Slater, 2001).
Previous research has implicated several specific situational
antecedents of self-objectification among women. These include
exposure to appearance-related commentary (Calogero, Herbozo,
& Thompson, 2009) and “fat talk” (Gapinski, Brownell, &
LaFrance, 2003); interpersonal experiences of sexual objectifica-
tion (Kozee, Tylka, Augustus-Horvath, & Denchik, 2007) and
stranger harassment (Fairchild & Rudman, 2008); environmental
exposure to appearance cues (e.g., appearance-related words, Rob-
erts & Gettman, 2004; bathroom scale, full-length mirrors, Tigge-
mann & Boundy, 2008) and mass media (Calogero et al., 2005;
Harper & Tiggemann, 2008); and merely anticipating a future
interaction with a male peer (Calogero, 2004). This research situ-
ates the experience of self-objectification within the context of
specific interpersonal or media encounters, but it does not address
the ideological concomitants of self-objectification, nor does it
consider the possibility that self-objectification is part of a broader
pattern of system-justifying (as opposed to system-challenging)
behavior.
In the present research, we investigate the possibility that self-
objectification might be activated by broader environmental ante-
cedents that convey information about culturally prescribed gender
roles and behaviors—without focusing on appearance. Specifi-
cally, we propose that reminders of culturally prevalent sexist
ideologies should increase women’s self-objectification, insofar as
these ideologies justify the status of gender relations in society and
coax and flatter women into conforming to traditional gender roles
(Glick & Fiske, 2001; Jackman, 1994; Jost & Kay, 2005). Yet, as
illustrated above, adopting an objectified self-perspective is detri-
mental to women both individually and collectively. We argue,
therefore, that a system justification perspective is useful for
explaining why women would self-objectify as a function of
exposure to sexist ideology, “even at the expense of personal and
group interest” (Jost & Banaji, 1994, p. 2).
According to system justification theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994;
Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004), dominant ideologies that justify
group inequality can affect the attitudes and behaviors of disad-
vantaged group members in ways that lead them to accept and
preserve the status quo. Self-objectification might be seen as a
manifestation of sexist ideologies that preserve the gender status
quo by directing women’s attention toward appearance manage-
ment at the expense of other life domains. This is a stronger test of
objectification theory, insofar as it suggests that self-
objectification does not stem merely from appearance evaluations,
but that self-objectification is actually situated within a more
extensive ideological network that justifies and maintains gender
inequality by encouraging women’s active participation in uphold-
ing the prevailing social norms that perpetuate their disadvantaged
status (Bem & Bem, 1970; Glick & Fiske, 2001; Jost & Kay,
2005). The primary aim of this article is to report new experimen-
tal evidence demonstrating that exposure to pervasive types of
sexist ideologies directly increases self-objectification and appear-
ance management among women but not men.
Sexism as Environmental Antecedent of
Self-Objectification
Sexism is an insidious component of women’s everyday social
environments. According to an investigation of sexism using a
daily diary methodology, women experience significantly more
sexism than do men, reporting at least one to two sexist incidents
per week (Swim, Hyers, Cohen, & Ferguson, 2001). These inci-
dents include expressions of traditional gender role stereotypes
(“You’re a woman, so fold my laundry”), demeaning comments
(“Yo bitch, get me some beer”), and sexual objectification (“For-
get the belt, look at her rack”). These incidents are by no means
exclusive to university settings. As illustrated in Nirmal Puwar’s
(2004) interviews with female members of the British Parliament,
women’s continued legitimacy within the legislature requires them
to suffer constant sexist remarks and to chronically monitor their
appearance to convey the right amount of femininity—all of which
makes it difficult to be effective in government.
Although sexism occurs in a variety of ways, hostile and be-
nevolent sexism represent two well-known forms (Glick & Fiske,
1996, 2001). Hostile sexism refers to an openly antagonistic atti-
tude toward women, whereas benevolent sexism refers to a sub-
jectively positive orientation toward women that casts “women as
wonderful but fragile creatures who ought to be protected and
provided for by men” (Glick et al., 2004, p. 715; see also Eagly,
Mladinic, & Otto, 1991). Both types of sexism convey information
about the division of structural power between the sexes by por-
traying women as weaker than men and more suitable for tradi-
tional domestic roles. However, benevolent sexism serves a pal-
liative, system-justifying function in that it makes women feel
better about their disadvantaged situation (see Jost & Hunyady,
2002; Jost & Kay, 2005). Researchers have suggested that the
“velvet glove” approach exemplified by benevolent sexism is more
insidious and effective than the “iron hand” of hostile sexism
because women are less likely to recognize or challenge it (Jack-
man, 1994; see also Barreto & Ellmers, 2005). As a result, many
women unwittingly participate in the perpetuation of benevolent
sexism by striving to attain traditionally feminine qualities (Glick
& Fiske, 1996; Kilianski & Rudman, 1998)—thereby collaborat-
ing in the maintenance of the current system of gender relations.
A body of research has accumulated to implicate benevolent
sexism in the subjugation (and self-subjugation) of women
(Abrams, Viki, Masser, & Bohner, 2003; Glick, Sakalli-Ugurlu,
Ferreira, & Souza, 2002; Jost & Kay, 2005; Lau, Kay, & Spencer,
2008; Napier, Thorisdottir, & Jost, 2010; Pryor, Geidd, & Wil-
liams, 1995; Sibley, Overall, & Duckitt, 2007; Viki & Abrams,
2002). Experiments have revealed that benevolently sexist remarks
undermine women’s cognitive performance by increasing self-
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doubt and worry (Dardenne, Dumont, & Bollier, 2007). Other
studies have found that the mere suggestion of sexism can impair
women’s cognitive performance (Adams, Garcia, Purdie-Vaughns,
& Steele, 2006). Building on this prior work, we propose that
benevolent sexism may also have deleterious consequences for
women’s self-body relations. That is, because benevolent sexism
praises women for their warmth and purity but simultaneously
implies that they are inferior to men and dependent upon them for
protection, women may direct their attention to areas that bring
them the most immediate social rewards and validation to coun-
teract the implications of incompetence and vulnerability.
In particular, the value assigned to women’s physical beauty is
linked to tangible social rewards for women (Davis, 1990; Eagly,
Ashmore, Makhijani, & Longo, 1991; Fiske, Bersoff, Borgida,
Deaux, & Heilman, 1991). Both women and men associate wom-
en’s attractiveness with a variety of rewarding life outcomes
(Dellinger & Williams, 1997; Dion, Berscheid, & Walster, 1972;
Engeln-Maddox, 2006; Evans, 2003), underscoring the assertion
that physical attractiveness functions as a form of currency for
women (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997; Unger, 1979). Although
directing attention to appearance domains and away from compe-
tence domains thwarts women’s self-determination (Breines,
Crocker, & Garcia, 2008) and reinforces their disadvantaged status
in the social hierarchy relative to men (Eagly, 1987; Glick,
Diebold, Bailey-Werner, & Zhu, 1997; Jackman, 1994; Jost &
Kay, 2005; cf., Jost, Pelham, & Carvallo, 2002; Prentice & Car-
ranza, 2002), women place more importance on appearance than
men, and they engage in more appearance management to conform
to beauty ideals (Dion, Dion, & Keelan, 1990).
We submit that benevolently sexist ideology may serve a dual
function of legitimizing gender inequality and eliciting gendered
behavior by increasing women’s self-objectification and appear-
ance management. This line of reasoning is consistent with Glick
and Fiske’s (2001) argument that sexist ideologies “represent a
system of rewards and punishments that provide incentive for
women to remain in conventional gender roles” (p. 116), thereby
encouraging them to attain success only in distinctly feminine
domains (Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Jackman, 1994). Correlational
evidence for this proposition exists: Greater endorsement of be-
nevolent sexism on the part of women has been associated with
more appearance-related beliefs and behaviors, such as cosmetic
use (Forbes, Doroszewicz, Card, & Adams-Curtis, 2004; Franzoi,
2001) and greater internalization of the thin ideal (Forbes, Col-
linsworth, Jobe, Braun, & Wise, 2007). Thus, women may engage
in self-objectification following exposure to benevolent sexism as
an indirect way of bringing themselves into line with socially
valued feminine ideals.
Benevolent and Complementary Expressions of Sexism
Although hostile and benevolent sexism are different in their
evaluative implications for women, they share some common
assumptions about women’s inferiority (Glick & Fiske, 1996,
2001). For that reason, exposure to one type of sexism versus
another should serve as a relatively unambiguous reminder of
culturally prevalent sexism. However, because hostile sexism is
more easily identified and rejected, we expected women’s self-
objectification to increase following exposure to benevolent sex-
ism but not to hostile sexism alone.
Drawing on prior work on complementary stereotypes (Bem, &
Bem, 1970; Glick & Fiske, 2001; Jost & Kay, 2005; Kay & Jost,
2003), we also hypothesized that women’s self-objectification
would increase following exposure to complementary sexist con-
tent (i.e., a combination of the two types of sexist beliefs). Ac-
cording to system justification theory, complementary stereotypi-
cal representations “depict low- and high-status groups as
possessing their own unique strengths and weaknesses (or benefits
and burdens),” communicating the sense that “no one groups has
it all” and that “every group has something going for it” (Kay et
al., 2007, p. 313). In this way, complementary stereotypes ratio-
nalize inequality among social groups (see also Napier et al.,
2010).
From a system justification perspective, the combination of
hostile and benevolent sexism is a potent ideological force that
should function as insidiously as benevolent sexism when it comes
to women’s self-objectification. Complementary (or perhaps com-
plimentary) sexism reminds people of the reasons why women are
both “revered and reviled”—characterizing them as socially val-
ued but also burdensome. By reframing traditional gender roles
and the division of labor within the family as a reflection of
women’s and men’s inherent strengths and weaknesses, gender
differences in society appear more legitimate, fair, natural, and
balanced (Jost & Kay, 2005; Kay et al., 2007). In a series of
studies, Jost and Kay found that simply reminding individuals of
benevolent and complementary (i.e., a combination of hostile and
benevolent) sexist beliefs increased women’s (but not men’s)
support for traditional gender arrangements and the social system
as a whole. Exposure to purely hostile beliefs and assignment to a
nonsexist control condition did not bring about these effects. We
build on this prior research by investigating the connection be-
tween those system-justifying ideologies that preserve gender in-
equality and women’s behavioral support for the status quo, in this
case, self-objectification.
To the extent that encounters with benevolent and complemen-
tary sexism make favorable portrayals of women in traditional
gender roles more cognitively accessible, we predicted that women
would report more self-objectification than would men when these
ideologies are made salient. We examined three specific outcomes
that characterize self-objectification (Calogero, 2010; Fredrickson
et al., 1998; McKinley & Hyde, 1996). Specifically, in response to
benevolent and complementary sexism, we expected that women
would value observable appearance-based attributes more highly
than competence-based attributes (i.e., self-objectification), en-
gage in more vigilant body monitoring (i.e., self-surveillance), and
experience more shame about their appearance (i.e., body shame),
in comparison with men. While these self-perceptions would not
seem to benefit individual women or women as a group, these
self-perceptions do serve a system-justifying function insofar as
they rationalize the structure of gender relations and reinforce
culturally prescribed gender roles (Jost & Kay, 2005).
Need to Avoid Closure as a Buffer Against the
Effects of Sexism
As well as testing the critical effect of benevolent and comple-
mentary forms of sexism on women’s self-objectification, we were
interested in whether individual differences in how people gener-
ally respond to ideological content would moderate this effect.
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According to Kruglanski’s (1989, 2006) lay epistemic theory,
needs to avoid or attain cognitive closure are fairly fundamental
epistemic motives that underlie how people approach and process
information they encounter in the social world (e.g., Saroglou &
Dupuis, 2006). Individual differences on a bipolar need for cog-
nitive closure (NfCC) dimension reflect dispositional variability in
epistemic motivation, so that one pole captures the motivation to
avoid cognitive closure (lower NfCC) and the other captures the
motivation to attain cognitive closure (higher NfCC).
People who score low on Webster and Kruglanski’s (1994)
NfCC scale are open to prolonging uncertainty, engage in more
deliberative decision-making and flexibility of thought, and exhibit
a higher tolerance for ambiguity and nonconformity. By contrast,
people who score high on NfCC generally prefer predictability and
quick decision-making; they exhibit rigidity of thought and a
greater preference for conformity (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996).
Such motivational tendencies to avoid or attain closure influence
the ways in which people interpret and respond to information in
their social environments and even whether they tend to anchor on
(and perpetuate) the status quo (e.g., cognitive conservatism) or
question and criticize it (e.g., Jost, Kruglanski, & Simon, 1999).
Consistent with these motivational tendencies, the need to avoid
cognitive closure is associated with less reliance on stereotypical
information to render decisions and social judgments (Dijkster-
huis, van Knippenberg, Kruglanski, & Schaper, 1996; Ford &
Kruglanski, 1996), less consensus-seeking and decreased support
for conventional social norms (De Grada, Kruglanski, Mannetti, &
Pierro, 1999; Fu et al., 2007; Jost et al., 1999), and more auton-
omy, self-direction, and openness to change (Calogero, Bardi, &
Sutton, 2009; Mannetti, Pierro, & Kruglanski, 2007). Moreover,
prior work suggests a reasonably strong connection between cog-
nitive conservatism and political conservatism (Jost, Glaser,
Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003), as predicted by system justifica-
tion theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008).
Thus, studies reveal significant positive relations between NfCC
and politically conservative opinions (Jost et al., 1999, 2003),
social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism (Van
Hiel, Pandelaere, & Duriez, 2004), and the endorsement of sexist
attitudes in particular (Doherty, 1998; Pek & Leong, 2003). These
findings indicate that high NfCC individuals are motivated to hold
enduring, traditional beliefs about authority and hierarchy and are
less likely to engage in counternormative behaviors, compared
with those who are lower in NfCC. To the extent that benevolent
and complementary sexism are system-justifying ideologies (Glick
& Fiske, 2001; Jost & Kay, 2005) and that system-justifying
ideologies serve epistemic functions of reducing uncertainty and
providing structure (Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Kay, Gaucher, Napier,
Callan, & Laurin, 2008; Stapel & Noordewier, in press), we
hypothesized that higher NfCC individuals would be most strongly
influenced by exposure to benevolent and complementary sexism,
and low scorers might even be protected from its effects.
We predicted, in other words, that NfCC would moderate the
effect of sexist ideology on self-objectification—and that the pat-
terns would be different for women and men. Because benevolent
(and complementary) sexism is a culturally accessible system-
justifying ideology that may be rewarding to women who accept
conventional stereotypes, we hypothesized that higher NfCC
women would be more likely than lower NfCC women to engage
in self-objectification and appearance management following ex-
posure to such ideological content. In this way, lower NfCC
individuals (or those who tend to prolong closure) might actually
afford some degree of protection against environmental sexism,
insofar as women who are inclined to think longer and harder (i.e.,
more critically) about gender inequality are less likely to follow
the more typical, culturally prevalent paths of system justification
and self-subjugation.
By contrast, we expected less variability in self-objectification
between the sexist exposure conditions as a function of NfCC for
men. However, because higher NfCC men would also tend to
anchor on the status quo and follow prescriptive cultural norms, we
considered the possibility that higher NfCC men would report less
self-objectification in response to benevolent sexism, insofar as
these appearance-related behaviors are inconsistent with the cul-
turally prescribed norms for masculinity implicit in sexist ideology
(McCreary, 1994; Mishkind, Rodin, Silberstein, & Striegel-
Moore, 1986; Vandello, Bosson, Cohen, Burnaford, & Weaver,
2008). Because hostile sexism is generally attributed to overt
discrimination and is less likely to be internalized by women in
Western societies (Glick & Fiske, 2001; Jost & Kay, 2005; cf.
Napier et al., 2010), we did not expect NfCC to moderate women’s
or men’s responses to hostile sexism.
Overview of Research
In three experiments, we exposed participants to sexist ideolo-
gies and measured the effect on self-objectification and appearance
management. Specifically, we hypothesized that exposure to be-
nevolent and complementary sexism would trigger more self-
objectification, self-surveillance, and body shame among women,
compared to men, whereas exposure to hostile sexism would not
trigger such increases. In all three experiments, we used a proof-
reading task to manipulate sexism exposure by reminding partic-
ipants about culturally prevalent sexist beliefs while varying the
specific contents that were activated (see Jost & Kay, 2005). We
then measured the impact of sexism exposure on self-
objectification and related outcomes. In Experiment 1, we tested
the hypothesis that benevolent and complementary sexism would
increase self-objectification, self-surveillance, and body shame
among women but not men. The inclusion of a control condition
with nonsexist favorable evaluations of women allowed us to
examine which types of sexism increased or decreased self-
objectification. Experiment 2 tested whether the effect of sexism
exposure on self-surveillance and body shame may carry over to
more general types of self-focus, such as public self-consciousness
or self-esteem. Experiment 2 also tested whether sexism exposure
would increase women’s intentions to engage in appearance-
management behaviors over the next week and whether experi-
ences of self-surveillance and body shame would mediate the
effect of sexism exposure on such intentions. Finally, Experiment
3 investigated the buffering role of the need to avoid cognitive




Participants and procedure. A total of 200 English-
speaking participants (100 men and 100 women) from a southeast-
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ern British university were recruited through advertisements on
campus and the psychology department website. All of the partic-
ipants were undergraduate students, with 39.29% in their first year
and 60.71% in their second year. Mean age of participants was
20.38 years (SD ! 1.22). The majority of the participants identi-
fied as British (94.8%), and the rest of the sample identified as
Nigerian (5.1%). Participants received either course credit or £3
(U.S.$5) for participation.
Female experimenters conducted all of the sessions with 2 to 5
participants who were individually seated at desks positioned in
different locations around the room to ensure privacy. Once seated,
participants faced a wall and therefore could not see (or be seen
by) other participants in the room. All of the materials and mea-
sures were administered by paper-and-pencil. Informed consent
was obtained from all participants before they began the study.
In order to minimize participants’ knowledge about the research
hypotheses, we presented the experiment as two separate studies
(e.g., Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977). Adapting procedures used
by Jost and Kay (2005), participants were first asked to perform a
two-part proofreading task, ostensibly to develop items for a new
attitude scale. We asked participants to first read and respond to a
set of four items that were presented to them in written format. We
then asked participants to read each of the items again, but this
time to carefully evaluate each statement for clarity and grammar.
After the proofreading task, we asked participants to complete a set
of questions from the personal well-being section of an ostensibly
larger study about college student health. This final set of ques-
tionnaires included the relevant dependent measures. When this set
of questionnaires was completed, we fully debriefed participants
and thanked them for their participation.
Manipulation of sexism exposure. Under the guise of the
proofreading task, participants were randomly assigned to read one
of four possible sets of statements that were intended to remind
them about culturally prevalent sexist ideologies while controlling
the specific sexist content that was activated. The four sets of
stimuli represented one of four types of sexist ideology: benevo-
lent sexism, hostile sexism, a combination of benevolent and
hostile sexism (complementary sexism), or no sexism. In their first
view of the statements, participants indicated the extent to which
they agreed with each of the four statements using a 6-point scale
ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). In their
second view of the statements, participants indicated the extent to
which each of the four statements was written clearly and without
ambiguity using a 6-point scale ranging from 0 (extremely unclear)
to 5 (extremely clear).
Statements that presented the benevolent and hostile beliefs
were based on items from Glick and Fiske’s (1996) Ambivalent
Sexism Inventory. Items presented in the benevolent sexism con-
dition included (a) “Many women have a quality of purity that few
men possess,” (b) “Men are incomplete without women,” (c)
“Women, compared to men, tend to have a superior moral sensi-
bility,” and (d) “Women should be cherished and protected by
men.” Items presented in the hostile sexism condition included (a)
“Women are too easily offended,” (b) “Most women do not fully
appreciate all that men do for them,” (c) “Women exaggerate
problems that they have at work,” and (d) “Women seek to gain
power by getting control over men.” We combined two items from
each of these scales to present complementary sexist beliefs: (a)
“Women, compared to men, tend to have a superior moral sensi-
bility,” (b) “Most women do not fully appreciate all that men do
for them,” (c) “Women should be cherished and protected by
men,” and (d) “Women seek to gain power by getting control over
men.” Following Jost and Kay (2005), items presented in the
nonsexist control condition were worded similarly to the benevo-
lent items and contained gender-neutral traits drawn from Hoffman
and Hurst (1990): (a) “Many women have a quality of resource-
fulness that few men possess,” (b) “Men are less creative than
women,” (c) “Women tend to be more tactful than men,” and (d)
“Women, compared to men, tend to be more realistic.”
Measures
State self-objectification. A modified version of the Self-
Objectification Questionnaire (Noll & Fredrickson, 1998) was
used to measure state self-objectification—the extent to which
individuals consider five observable appearance-based attributes
(i.e., physical attractiveness, weight, sex appeal, measurements,
firm/sculpted muscles) to be more important than five nonobserv-
able competence-based attributes (i.e., health, strength, energy
level, physical coordination, physical fitness). Respondents were
instructed to rank all 10 attributes in the order of their impact on
their physical self-concept “right now” from “least impact on my
physical self-concept” (rank ! 0) to “greatest impact on my
physical self-concept” (rank ! 9). The same rank could not to be
assigned to more than one attribute. Difference scores were com-
puted by subtracting the sum of the five competence-based at-
tributes from the sum of the five appearance-based attributes to
reflect the relative emphasis given to these two dimensions. The
possible range of scores was –25 to 25, with higher scores indi-
cating greater self-objectification. Because of the initial rank or-
dering of the attributes, reliability is determined by correlating the
sum of the appearance ranks and the sum of the competence ranks
(Hill & Fischer, 2008). If respondents rank the appearance-based
attributes as more important then the competence-based attributes
must be ranked as less important, and therefore, a negative corre-
lation would be expected between the two sets of attributes. In the
present study, a strong negative correlation was demonstrated
between appearance and competence rankings, indicating good
reliability (r ! ".88).
Self-surveillance. The Surveillance scale of the Objectified
Body Consciousness Scale (McKinley & Hyde, 1996; # ! .81)
was used to measure the degree to which individuals monitor
their bodies as an outside observer would. Participants rated
eight items from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree),
such as “I rarely worry about how I look to other people”
(reverse scored). Mean item scores were calculated to provide
an index of self-surveillance, with higher scores indicating
more body monitoring.
Body shame. The Shame scale of the Objectified Body
Consciousness Scale (McKinley & Hyde, 1996; # ! .81) was used
to measure the degree to which individuals feel shame about how
their bodies look. Participants rated eight items from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), such as, “When I’m not the size I
think I should be, I feel ashamed.” Mean item scores were calcu-
lated to provide an index of body shame, with higher scores
indicating more body shame.
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Results
All dependent variables were analyzed using a two-way, four-
level analysis of variance (ANOVA) with sexism exposure (be-
nevolent vs. hostile vs. complementary vs. neutral) and participant
sex (male vs. female) as the between-subjects variables. Follow-up
t tests were used to determine group differences. Partial eta-
squared ($p2) values are reported to estimate effect size. Means and
standard deviations for the dependent variables are presented in
Table 1, separated by gender. A series of zero-order correlations
were conducted to investigate the relations among the self-
objectification variables. For women, state self-objectification was
significantly correlated with self-surveillance, r(98) ! .45, p %
.001, and body shame, r(98) ! .25, p % .05; and self-surveillance
was significantly correlated with body shame, r(98) ! .63, p %
.001. For men, significant, positive correlations were observed
between state self-objectification and self-surveillance, r(98) !
.60, p % .001, and self-surveillance and body shame, r(98) ! .28,
p % .01; however, state-self-objectification and body shame were
not significantly correlated, r(98) ! ".16, p ! .11.
State self-objectification. As expected, there was a signifi-
cant effect of participant sex on state self-objectification, F(1,
192) ! 81.46, p % .001, $p2 ! .30, such that women (M ! 6.86,
SD ! 11.62) reported higher scores than did men (M ! "8.04,
SD ! 13.59). Sexism exposure also exerted a significant main
effect, F(3, 192) ! 9.35, p % .001, $p2 ! .13. Of greatest interest
to the present research, however, was the interaction between
participant sex and exposure to sexism, F(3, 192) ! 4.06, p % .01,
$p
2 ! .06. As predicted, women who were exposed to benevolent
sexism exhibited more state self-objectification (M ! 14.36) than
did women who were exposed to hostile sexism (M ! 1.44),
t(48) ! 6.99, p % .001, $p2 ! .50, or those assigned to the no
sexism control condition (M ! "1.72), t(48) ! 4.68, p % .001,
$p
2 ! .31. Also as predicted, women exposed to complementary
sexism exhibited more state self-objectification (M ! 13.36) than
did women exposed to hostile, t(48) ! 8.23, p % .001, $p2 ! .59,
or no sexism, t(48) ! 4.66, p % .001, $p2 ! .31. There were no
other significant differences between conditions for women: be-
nevolent versus complementary, t(48) ! 0.46, p ! .65; hostile
versus no sexism, t(48) ! 1.05, p ! .30. As expected, men’s state
self-objectification did not significantly vary across type of sexism
exposure, with p values ranging from .13 to .99.
Self-surveillance. As expected, there was a significant main
effect of participant sex on self-surveillance, F(1, 192) ! 30.29,
p % .001, $p2 ! .16, such that women (M ! 4.57, SD ! 1.40)
exhibited higher scores than did men (M ! 3.76, SD ! 1.18).
Sexism exposure also had a significant main effect, F(3, 192) !
18.85, p % .001, $p2 ! .29; however, of greatest interest was the
interaction between participant sex and type of sexism exposure,
F(3, 192) ! 19.76, p % .001, $p2 ! .31. As hypothesized, women
who were exposed to benevolent sexism reported significantly
more self-surveillance (M ! 5.85) than did women exposed to
hostile sexism (M ! 3.36), t(48) ! 9.64, p % .001, $p2 ! .66, or
no sexism (M ! 4.05), t(48) ! 5.63, p % .001, $p2 ! .40. Also as
predicted, women exposed to complementary sexism reported
more self-surveillance (M ! 5.04) than did women exposed to
hostile, t(48) ! 6.25, p % .001, $p2 ! .45, or no sexism, t(48) !
3.01, p % .01, $p2 ! .16.
Two additional findings were noteworthy. First, women who
were exposed to benevolent sexism alone reported significantly
more self-surveillance than did women exposed to complementary
sexism, t(48)! 2.71, p% .01, $p2 ! .13. Second, women who were
exposed to hostile sexism reported less self-surveillance than did
women exposed to no sexism, t(48) ! "2.39, p % .03, $p2 ! .11.
As expected, men’s self-surveillance did not significantly vary
across the sexism exposure conditions ( p-values ranged from .10
to .44), with one exception: Men who were exposed to comple-
mentary sexism (M! 2.76) reported less self-surveillance than did
men exposed to benevolent (M ! 4.32), t(48) ! "5.04, p % .001,
$p
2 ! .35, hostile (M ! 3.87), t(48) ! "2.95, p % .01, $p2 ! .15,
or no sexism (M ! 4.09), t(48) ! "4.08, p % .001, $p2 ! .26.
Body shame. As expected, participant sex exerted a signifi-
cant main effect on body shame, F(1, 192) ! 173.88, p % .001,
$p
2 ! .91, such that women (M ! 3.93, SD ! 1.22) reported more
shame than men (M ! 2.55, SD ! 0.43). Sexism exposure exerted
a significant main effect as well, F(3, 192) ! 24.95, p % .001,
$p
2 ! .38. Once again, the analysis yielded an interaction between
participant sex and type of sexism exposure, F(3, 192) ! 24.57,
p % .001, $p2 ! .38. As predicted, women who were exposed to
benevolent sexism reported more body shame (M ! 4.70) than did
women exposed to hostile sexism (M ! 2.99), t(48) ! 5.80, p %
.001, $2 ! .41, or no sexism (M ! 3.08), t(48) ! 6.87, p % .001,
$p
2 ! .50. Also as predicted, women who were exposed to com-
plementary sexism reported more body shame (M ! 4.95) than did
women exposed to hostile sexism, t(48) ! 6.55, p % .001, $p2 !
.47, or no sexism, t(48) ! 7.75, p % .001, $p2 ! .56. There were
no other significant differences between conditions for
women: benevolent versus complementary, t(48) ! "0.78, p !
.44; hostile versus no sexism, t(48) !"0.50, p ! .62. Men’s body
shame did not vary significantly across type of sexism exposure,
with p values ranging from .60 to .92.
Table 1



















Self-objectification "1.72a (14.79) 14.36b (8.71) 13.36b (6.57) 1.44a (3.06) "8.04c (13.59) "4.48c (14.81) "8.80c (12.77) "8.84c (15.81)
Self-surveillance 4.05a (1.22) 5.85b (1.03) 5.04c (1.09) 3.36d (0.78) 4.09a (1.18) 4.32a (0.51) 2.78e (1.44) 3.87a (1.19)
Body shame 3.08a (1.24) 4.70b (1.15) 4.95b (1.18) 2.99a (0.92) 2.54c (0.58) 2.53c (0.40) 2.58c (0.25) 2.57c (0.45)
Note. Means with different subscripts within rows differ significantly at p % .05.
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Discussion
Our first experiment demonstrated that exposure to benevolent and
complementary sexism increased women’s self-objectification, self-
surveillance, and body shame, whereas men’s scores were consis-
tently low and generally unaffected by sexism exposure. To our
knowledge, this is the first experiment to reveal a causal link between
environmental exposure to culturally prevalent, system-justifying sex-
ist beliefs and self-objectification. The fact that the contents of these
sexist beliefs communicated stereotypical information about wom-
en’s perceived warmth and competence without mentioning
their bodies or appearance suggests that benevolent sexism is a
relatively powerful but inconspicuous environmental trigger of
women’s self-objectification. Experiment 2 built on these re-
sults in several ways.
First, we considered the possibility that the effects of benevolent
and complementary sexism exposure may carry over to more
general types of self-focus and self-esteem. Because benevolent
and complementary forms of sexism implicitly suggest that
women lack ability and competence, it is possible that exposure to
these particular beliefs activates more general public self-
consciousness and/or diminishes overall self-esteem, in which case
it would not be unique to self-objectification. To investigate this
possibility, in Experiment 2 we examined the effect of sexism
exposure on public self-consciousness and general self-esteem,
along with self-surveillance and body shame. We expected wom-
en’s, but not men’s, self-surveillance and body shame to increase
in response to benevolent and complementary sexism, but we did
not necessarily expect public self-consciousness or general self-
esteem to be similarly affected. Based on prior research, we
expected that public self-consciousness would be higher and gen-
eral self-esteem would be lower among women, compared with
men, across conditions (Calogero & Watson, 2009; Kling, Hyde,
Showers, & Buswell, 1999).
Second, we sought to test whether a single instance of sexism
exposure could affect women’s appearance-management inten-
tions over the next week. If benevolent forms of sexism motivate
women to focus more on traditionally feminine qualities, then
following reminders of benevolent and complementary sexism we
expected that more thoughts about appearance-management would
be activated (e.g., exercise, dieting, makeup use, hair styling,
tanning, clothes shopping) when women considered their daily
plans and intentions for the next week. In predicting that only
women would report more appearance-management intentions af-
ter sexism exposure, we sought to highlight how environmental
sexism is differentially experienced by men and women. Presum-
ably, sexism elicits gendered behavior that may bring a variety of
social rewards to women but may also interfere with actual change
in women’s social status and power. In considering the mecha-
nisms by which sexism exposure may trigger more appearance-
management intentions, we predicted that the experience of self-
surveillance and body shame would play a critical role.
Specifically, we tested whether the experience of self-surveillance
and/or body shame would mediate the effect of sexism exposure
on women’s appearance-management intentions.
Finally, we sought to revisit the finding from Experiment 1 that
men’s self-surveillance was significantly lower under conditions
of complementary sexism exposure, compared with the other con-
ditions. Although this pattern of results was only observed with
respect to self-surveillance, we considered the possibility that the
system-justifying nature of complementary sexist stereotypes
would lead men to care even less than usual about how their bodies
appear to others, insofar as most body concerns are inconsistent
with stereotypical masculine gender roles (Hargreaves & Tigge-
mann, 2006). Thus, we sought to replicate and extend these find-
ings for self-surveillance in a new sample of men.
Experiment 2
Method
A total of 200 English-speaking participants (100 men and 100
women) from a southeastern British university were recruited
through advertisements on campus and the psychology departmen-
tal website. Approximately half the participants were undergrad-
uate students (53.5%), whereas 46.5% were university staff mem-
bers. Mean age of participants was 33.85 years (SD ! 9.89).The
majority of participants identified as White British (82%), but
18.0% identified some other ethnicity. Participants received either
course credit or £5 (U.S.$7) for their participation.
Materials and procedure were virtually identical to Experiment
1, except that we added three scales. In addition to completing
measures of self-surveillance and body shame, participants com-
pleted the seven-item Public Self-Consciousness subscale (Fenig-
stein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975; # ! .93; e.g., “I’m concerned about
what other people think of me”), using a scale ranging from 1 (not
at all true of me) to 7 (very true of me), and the 10-item Self-
Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1986; # ! .89; e.g., “On the whole, I
am satisfied with myself”), using a scale ranging from 1 (strongly
agree) to 4 (strongly disagree). Means were calculated to provide
an index for each of the dependent variables.
Participants were also given 2.5 minutes to perform a free
writing task. Using a modified version of Lane and Wegner’s
(1995) thought task instructions, participants were asked to think
about the week ahead and to describe any information pertaining to
their daily plans and personal intentions for the week. This could
include “plans, behaviors, images, feelings, ideas, efforts to
solve problems, observations, tasks, travel. . . . Please include
whatever comes to mind about your personal intentions for the
coming week.” Two independent judges who were unaware of
the research hypotheses or the sex of the participants coded the
responses. Responses were coded 1 if they were related to
appearance and 0& if they were unrelated to appearance. Exam-
ples of the types of appearance-management thoughts and in-
tentions reported by participants included references to exer-
cise, dieting/weight loss, tanning, makeup use, clothes
shopping, hair styling/hair color, nail appointments, or body
feelings. Interrater agreement for the coding of responses was
high (' ! .92). The responses were summed to create a total
appearance-management score, such that higher scores indi-
cated a greater frequency of thoughts and intentions related to
appearance-management.
Results
All dependent variables were analyzed using a two-way, four-
level ANOVA with sexism exposure (benevolent vs. hostile vs.
complementary vs. neutral) and gender (male vs. female) as the
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between-subjects variables (see Table 2). Follow-up t tests were
used to determine group differences. Partial eta-squared ($p2) val-
ues are reported to estimate effect size. Because of the higher mean
age of participants in this sample, we inspected correlations be-
tween age and each of the dependent variables to check for
possible age effects. Age was not significantly correlated with
self-surveillance, r(198) ! ".07, p ! .31, body shame, r(198) !
".09, p ! .30, appearance-management intentions, r(198) !
".06, p ! .36, public self-consciousness, r(198) ! ".04, p ! .59,
or global self-esteem, r(198) ! .01, p ! .94.
A series of zero-order correlations were conducted to test the
relations among the self-objectification variables. For women,
self-surveillance was positively correlated with body shame,
r(98) ! .62, p % .001, and appearance-management intentions,
r(98) ! .51, p % .001; body shame was positively correlated
with appearance-management intentions, r(98) ! .52, p % .001.
For men, self-surveillance was significantly correlated with
body shame, r(98) ! .37, p % .001, but unrelated to
appearance-management intentions, r(98) ! .05, p ! .63, and
body shame was unrelated to appearance-management inten-
tions, r(98) ! .10, p ! .31.
Self-surveillance. As predicted, participant sex exerted a
significant effect on self-surveillance, F(1, 192) ! 82.67, p %
.001, $p2 ! .30, such that women (M ! 4.28, SD ! 1.27) exhibited
higher scores than men (M ! 3.09, SD ! 0.65). In addition, we
observed a significant effect for sexism exposure on self-
surveillance, F(3, 192) ! 5.11, p % .01, $p2 ! .07. These effects
were qualified by the significant interaction between participant
sex and type of sexism exposure, F(3, 192) ! 7.34, p % .001,
$p
2 ! .10. As predicted, women who were exposed to benevolent
sexism reported more self-surveillance (M ! 4.93) than did
women exposed to hostile sexism (M ! 3.76), t(48) ! 3.26, p %
.01, $p2 ! .18, or no sexism (M ! 3.75), t(48) ! 3.27, p % .01,
$p
2 ! .18. Also as predicted, women who were exposed to com-
plementary sexism reported more self-surveillance (M ! 4.69)
than did women exposed to hostile sexism, t(48) ! 3.22, p % .01,
$2 ! .17, or no sexism, t(48) ! 3.23, p % .01, $2 ! .17. There
were no other significant differences between conditions for
women: benevolent versus complementary, t(48) ! 0.70, p ! .49,
and hostile versus no sexism, t(48) ! 0.02, p ! .98.
As in Experiment 1, men who were exposed to complementary
sexism (M ! 2.75) reported less self-surveillance than did men
exposed to benevolent sexism (M! 3.25), t(48)!"2.58, p% .02,
$2 ! .12, hostile sexism (M ! 3.17), t(48) ! "2.24, p % .03,
$p
2 ! .10, or no sexism (M ! 3.16), t(48) ! "2.30, p % .03,
$p
2 ! .09. There were no other significant differences between
conditions for men ( p values ranged from .62 to .98).
Body shame. As hypothesized, participant sex had a signif-
icant effect on body shame, F(1, 192)! 97.07, p% .001, $p2 ! .34,
such that women (M ! 4.21, SD ! 1.33) reported more shame
than did men (M ! 2.87, SD ! 0.62). There was also a significant
main effect for sexism exposure, F(3, 192) ! 6.90, p % .001,
$p
2 ! .10. Again, these effects were qualified by the significant
interaction between participant sex and type of sexism exposure,
F(3, 192) ! 5.86, p % .001, $p2 ! .08. As predicted, women who
were exposed to benevolent sexism reported more body shame
(M! 4.87) than did women exposed to hostile sexism (M! 3.67),
t(48) ! 3.86, p % .001, $p2 ! .24, or no sexism (M ! 3.60),
t(48) ! 3.74, p % .001, $p2 ! .23. Also as predicted, women who
were exposed to complementary sexism reported more body
shame (M ! 4.72) than did women who were exposed to hostile
sexism, t(48) ! 3.03, p % .01, $p2 ! .16, or no sexism, t(48) !
3.00, p % .01, $p2 ! .16. There were no other significant differ-
ences between conditions for women: benevolent versus comple-
mentary, t(48) ! 0.45, p ! .66, and hostile versus no sexism,
t(48) ! 0.19, p ! .85. As in Experiment 1, men’s body shame did
not significantly vary across type of sexism exposure ( ps ! .14
to .46).
Public self-consciousness and general self-esteem. As ex-
pected, participant sex exerted significant effects on public self-
consciousness, F(1, 192) ! 37.66, p % .001, $p2 ! .16, and general
self-esteem, F(1, 192) ! 37.67, p % .001, $p2 ! .16, such that
women (M ! 5.40, SD ! 0.67) exhibited more public self-
consciousness than did men (M ! 4.83, SD ! 0.64), but lower
self-esteem (M! 3.18, SD! 0.51) than did men (M! 3.60, SD!
0.45) across the sexism exposure conditions. There was no signif-
icant main effect of type of sexism exposure on public self-
consciousness, F(3, 192) ! 1.55, p ! .20, or global self-esteem,
F(3, 192) ! 0.99, p ! .40. Participant sex did not significantly
interact with sexism exposure to predict public self-consciousness,
F(3, 192)! 1.89, p! .13, or global self-esteem, F(3, 192)! 1.31,
p ! .27.
Appearance-management intentions. A total of 209 re-
sponses were identified as appearance-management thoughts and
intentions, with 67.5% of the sample expressing at least one
appearance-related intention for the week ahead. Table 3 displays
the type and frequency of appearance-management intentions as a
function of gender. The most frequently cited appearance-related
Table 2


















Self-surveillance 3.75a (1.12) 4.93b (1.40) 4.69b (0.93) 3.76a (1.12) 3.16c (0.55) 3.25c (0.65) 2.75d (0.70) 3.17c (0.60)
Body shame 3.60a (1.33) 4.87b (1.05) 4.72b (1.31) 3.67a (1.15) 2.73c (0.68) 3.00c (0.71) 2.77c (0.54) 2.99c (0.56)
Public self-consciousness 5.56a (0.57) 5.48a (0.71) 5.53a (0.74) 5.55a (0.65) 4.85b (0.56) 4.84b (0.70) 4.73b (0.75) 4.91b (0.56)
General self-esteem 3.15a (0.56) 3.26a (0.52) 3.19a (0.52) 3.11a (0.46) 3.79b (0.43) 3.54b (0.52) 3.57b (0.52) 3.56b (0.40)
Appearance management 0.76a,d (0.72) 2.20b (1.53) 2.00b (1.32) 0.88a (0.73) 0.72c,d (0.65) 0.64c (0.64) 0.60c (0.61) 0.56c (0.65)
Note. Means with different subscripts across columns (within gender group) differ significantly at p % .05.
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concerns were the desire to engage in physical exercise (for men
and women both) and the intention to diet or attempt to lose weight
(for women only).
As hypothesized, participant sex exerted a significant effect on
the number of appearance-management intentions that came to
mind during the thought-writing task, F(1, 192)! 40.78, p% .001,
$p
2 ! .18, such that women (M ! 1.46, SD ! 1.29) mentioned
more intentions related to appearance management than did men
(M ! 0.63, SD ! 0.63). Sexism exposure exerted a significant
effect on appearance-management intentions, F(3, 192) ! 9.49,
p % .001, $p2 ! .13. The analysis also revealed a statistical
interaction between participant sex and type of sexism exposure,
F(3, 192) ! 7.08, p % .001, $p2 ! .10. As predicted, women who
were exposed to benevolent sexism wrote more about appearance-
management intentions (M ! 2.20) than did women exposed to
hostile sexism (M ! 0.88), t(48) ! 3.90, p % .001, $p2 ! .23, or
no sexism (M ! 0.76), t(48) ! 4.26, p % .001, $p2 ! .27. Women
who were exposed to complementary sexism also wrote more
about appearance-management intentions (M ! 2.00) than did
women exposed to hostile sexism, t(48) ! 3.71, p % .001, $p2 !
.21, or no sexism, t(48) ! 4.11, p % .001, $p2 ! .25. There were
no other significant differences between conditions for women:
benevolent versus complementary, t(48) ! 0.50, p ! .62, and
hostile versus no sexism, t(48) ! 0.59, p ! .56. As expected,
men’s appearance-management intentions did not significantly
differ across type of sexism exposure ( ps ! .36 to .83).
To further investigate why sexism exposure might lead to more
appearance-management intentions in women, we conducted a
series of regression analyses to test whether self-surveillance and
body shame mediated the effect of sexism exposure on such
intentions. Because women’s intentions to manage their appear-
ance did not statistically differ between the benevolent and com-
plementary sexism conditions, we combined these conditions to
form a single system-justifying sexism exposure condition (see
Jost & Kay, 2005). Similarly, because women’s appearance-
management intentions in the hostile sexism and no sexism con-
ditions were not significantly different, we combined these condi-
tions to form a single contrast condition (system justification
condition ! 1; nonbenevolent condition ! "1). We followed the
criteria and recommendations established by several authors to test
the hypothesis that self-surveillance and body shame would me-
diate the effect of sexism exposure on appearance-management
intentions (see Baron & Kenny, 1986; Holmbeck, 1997). We used
a Monte Carlo resampling simulation to test the significance of the
indirect effects for self-surveillance and body shame (MacKinnon,
Lockwood, & Williams, 2004) using the interactive calculator
created by Selig and Preacher (2008, June). In the present study,
20,000 Monte Carlo samples were generated to estimate 95%
confidence intervals for the hypothesized indirect effects based on
the distributions of the observed estimates. Indirect effects are
significant when the lower limits of the confidence intervals are
greater than zero.
In the first step, we regressed appearance-management inten-
tions on system justification (i.e., benevolent and complementary
sexism) exposure, demonstrating a significant effect of system
justification exposure (( ! .50, p % .001). In the second step, we
regressed the hypothesized mediators, self-surveillance and body
shame, on system justification exposure in separate equations. This
analysis also revealed significant effects of system justification
exposure on self-surveillance (( ! .42, p % .001) and body shame
(( ! .44, p % .001). In the third step, appearance-management
intentions were regressed onto the proposed mediators simulta-
neously. These analyses revealed that self-surveillance (( ! .30,
p % .01) and body shame (( ! .33, p % .01) both predicted
appearance-management intentions. Finally, in the last step,
appearance-management intentions were regressed onto system
justification exposure and the proposed mediators simultaneously.
As shown in Figure 1, type of sexism exposure, self-
surveillance, and body shame remained significant predictors of
appearance-management intentions in the full model, but the ef-
fects were smaller. Results from the Monte Carlo simulation
demonstrated that self-surveillance (95% CI: .08, .34) and body
shame (95% CI: .09, .35) significantly mediated the relation be-
tween system justification exposure and appearance-management
intentions. The full model accounted for 39% of the variance in
women’s intentions to engage in appearance-management behav-
iors over the next week (R2 ! .39), F(3, 96) ! 20.57, p % .001.
Thus, the greater activation of appearance-management intentions
among women after exposure to either benevolent or complemen-
tary sexism could be explained, at least partially, by the experience















Figure 1. Self-surveillance and body shame as mediators of women’s
appearance-management intentions in response to benevolent sexism (Ex-
periment 2). Coefficients in parentheses represent parameter estimates for
the regression model containing sexism exposure and both mediators as
predictor variables. ! p % .05. !! p % .01. !!! p % .001.
Table 3
Type and Frequency of Appearance-Management Intentions by




Dieting/weight loss 55 8
Tanning 11 0
Haircut/color hair 10 4
Nail grooming 6 0
Clothes shopping 5 1
Makeup use 2 0
Hair removal 4 3
Negative body feelings 3 2
Note. Exercise included any reference to intentional physical activity
(e.g., exercising, working out, lifting weights, running, going to the gym,
attending sports practice, or engaging in recreational sports activities).
Dieting/weight loss included any reference to monitoring food intake
and/or weight and weight loss attempts. Negative body feelings included
evaluations of appearance (e.g., worrying about weight, disliking specific
body parts) but not behavioral intentions.
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Discussion
Experiment 2 provided further evidence that merely reminding
women of system-justifying sexist stereotypes directly increases
their body monitoring and appearance-related concerns. Again, we
demonstrated that exposure to benevolent and complementary
sexism, and not other favorable (or unfavorable) descriptions of
women, triggered more self-objectification (cf. Jost & Kay, 2005).
We also found that public self-consciousness and general self-
esteem were unmoved by exposure to benevolent or complemen-
tary sexism, indicating that these stereotypes increase women’s
focus on the self as an object of (presumably male) evaluation but
do not necessarily affect other forms of self-focus.
In contrast to the first experiment, we did not observe specific
reactance from women in response to hostile sexism. However, we
did once again observe markedly lower levels of self-surveillance
among men who were exposed to complementary sexism. Al-
though it was unpredicted, this serendipitous finding is theoreti-
cally interpretable. Whereas the benevolent component of comple-
mentary sexism would have reminded men that some women
should be protected and cherished, the hostile component would
have reminded them that some women challenge men’s power.
Thus, men were simultaneously reminded of their protector role as
well as their greater power. These two aspects may have led men
to be even freer than usual from appearance-related constraints or
prescriptions (cf. Vandello et al., 2008; Ybarra, 2002).
Experiment 2 also revealed that women were thinking more
about appearance management following exposure to benevolent
and complementary sexism, as indicated by the contents of their
daily plans and personal intentions for the week ahead. When we
investigated possible mediating mechanisms for this effect, we
found that self-surveillance and body shame both served to par-
tially mediate the effect of sexism exposure on appearance-
management intentions. These findings suggest that women direct
more attention and energy toward their appearance as a result of
their daily encounters with seemingly positive forms of sexism
because of the experience of self-surveillance and body shame that
is triggered by such sexism exposure. Based on these results, we
conclude that subtle reminders of benevolent sexism encourage
women to anticipate being evaluated based on their appearance; as
a result, they invest more time and energy than men in planning
future activities that allow them to manage and control how they
appear to others.
In Experiment 3, we investigated a potential buffer or protective
mechanism against increased self-objectification in response to
sexism exposure, namely the need to avoid closure. Because
individual differences in NfCC are associated with acceptance
versus rejection of stereotypical information and cultural norms, as
well as preferences for predictable and stable social structures
(Fu et al., 2007; Kruglanski, 2006; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994),
and the endorsement of more conservative, system-justifying atti-
tudes in general (Jost et al., 2003; Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Jost et
al., 1999), we predicted that lower NfCC women would report less
self-objectification, self-surveillance, and body shame in response
to benevolent and complementary sexism compared to higher
NfCC women. Conversely, we expected higher NfCC men to
report less self-objectification, self-surveillance, and body shame
overall compared to lower NfCC men. Finally, we modified the
manipulation of sexism exposure to more directly test the effect of




A total of 200 English-speaking participants (100 men and 100
women) from a southeastern British university were recruited from
the psychology department website and received course credit for
participation. All participants were undergraduate students, with
35.9% in their first year and 64.1% in their second year. Mean age
of participants was 19.99 years (SD! 1.24). Participants identified
as White British (74.3%), Asian (11.8%), or Black African (7.9%).
Materials and procedures were virtually identical to Experiment
1. Participants performed the proofreading task as a manipulation
of sexism but only received instructions on how to evaluate each
statement for clarity. Afterward, they completed measures of state
self-objectification (r ! ".92), self-surveillance (# ! .89), and
body shame (# ! .85). Mean scores were calculated to provide an
index for each of the dependent variables.
We also tested the moderating role of NfCC on responses to
sexism exposure. Participants completed the 41-item Need for
Cognitive Closure Questionnaire (Roets & van Heil, 2007) earlier
in the academic term as part of a mass-testing session by rating the
extent to which they agreed with each of the items, using a 6-point
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree), such
as, “I don’t like situations that are uncertain,” and “I do not usually
consult many different opinions before forming my own view.”
Higher scores indicated a stronger need to attain cognitive closure
(# ! .88).
Results
All dependent variables were analyzed with multiple regression
analyses, with dummy variables for three of the four sexism
exposure conditions (benevolent, hostile, and complementary),
mean-centered NfCC (M !3.60, SD ! 0.34), and the interaction
between each sexism exposure dummy variable and NfCC as
independent predictors. Follow-up simple slope analyses were
used to determine group differences. To illustrate potential inter-
actions, we plotted the dependent variables at low (one standard
deviation below the mean) and high (one standard deviation above
the mean) values of NfCC (Aiken & West, 1991). A one-way
ANOVA confirmed that there were no differences in NfCC, F(3,
196) ! 0.67, p ! .57, across experimental conditions. To simplify
analyses, women’s and men’s scores were examined separately.
Means and standard deviations for all study variables are presented
in Table 4, separated by gender.
A series of zero-order correlations were conducted to test the
relations among the self-objectification variables. For women,
state self-objectification was significantly correlated with self-
surveillance, r(98) ! .37, p % .001, and body shame, r(98) ! .31,
p % .01; self-surveillance was significantly correlated with body
shame, r(98) ! .60, p % .001. For men, state self-objectification
was positively correlated with self-surveillance, r(98) ! .58, p %
.001, and negatively correlated with body shame, r(98) ! ".23,
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p % .05; self-surveillance was positively correlated with body
shame, r(98) ! .39, p % .001.
Hypothesis testing: State self-objectification.
Women. As expected, exposure to benevolent sexism (( ! .53,
p % .001) and complementary sexism (( ! .40, p % .001) predicted
higher state self-objectification, whereas hostile sexism did not (( !
".08, p! .43). Neither NfCC ((!".05, p! .80) nor the interaction
terms ((s ranged from ".03 to .21, ps ! .10 to .81) were significant
predictors of women’s state self-objectification.
Men. Neither sexism exposure ((s ranged from ".06 to .02,
ps ! .64–.95, NfCC, ( ! .22, p ! .45) nor the interaction terms
((s ranged from".33 to".02, ps! .12–.90) predicted men’s state
self-objectification.
Hypothesis testing: Self-surveillance.
Women. As in the previous studies, exposure to benevolent
(( ! .43, p % .001) and complementary sexism (( !.21, p %
.001) predicted higher self-surveillance, whereas exposure to hos-
tile sexism did not (( ! ".05, p ! .39). NfCC did not predict
self-surveillance (( ! 0.20, p ! .86), but NfCC did interact with
benevolent (( ! .64, p % .001) and complementary sexism expo-
sure (( ! .47, p % .001) to moderate the effects of sexism
exposure on self-surveillance scores. As illustrated in Figure 2a,
lower NfCC women experienced markedly less self-surveillance
than did higher NfCC women following exposure to benevolent
sexism (( ! .96, p % .001) or complementary sexism (( ! .92,
p % .001). NfCC did not moderate self-surveillance in response to
hostile sexism (( ! .09, p ! .66) or no sexism (( ! .03, p ! .87).
Men. Exposure to complementary sexism (( ! ".28, p %
.01) predicted lower self-surveillance in men, whereas benevolent
(( ! .10, p ! .32) and hostile sexism (( ! ".01, p ! .97), were
unrelated to self-surveillance. NfCC was also unrelated to self-
surveillance (( ! ".16, p ! .50); however, the analysis revealed
a significant interaction between complementary sexism exposure
and NfCC (( ! ".41, p % .01). As can be seen in Figure 2b,
higher NfCC men experienced markedly less self-surveillance than
did lower NfCC men following exposure to complementary sex-
ism (( ! ".89, p % .001). NfCC did not moderate men’s re-
sponses to benevolent (( ! .01, p ! .99), hostile (( ! ".23, p !
.26), or nonsexist exposure (( ! ".15, p ! .47).
Hypothesis resting: Body shame.
Women. As expected, exposure to benevolent (( ! .43, p %
.001) and complementary sexism (( ! .40, p % .001) predicted
women’s body shame, whereas hostile sexism did not (( ! ".08,
p ! .16). NfCC did not predict body shame, ( ! ".07, p ! .52,
but these effects were qualified by interactions with sexism expo-
sure, such that NfCC moderated the effects of benevolent (( ! .58,
p% .001), and complementary sexism (( ! .51, p% .001) on body
shame. As illustrated in Figure 3a, lower NfCC women experi-
enced markedly less body shame than did higher NfCC women
after exposure to benevolent (( ! .95, p % .001) and complemen-
tary sexism (( ! .94, p % .001). NfCC did not moderate body
shame in response to hostile sexism (( ! ".12, p ! .56) or in the
no sexism control condition (( ! ".13, p ! .53).
Men. Exposure to complementary sexism (( ! ".46, p %
.001), but not hostile (( ! ".10, p ! .32) or benevolent sexism
(( ! ".13, p ! .20), predicted significantly less body shame.
Again, NfCC did not predict body shame (( ! ".38, p ! .11), but
it did interact with exposure to complementary sexism (( ! ".37,
p % .03) to moderate men’s body shame scores. As seen in
Figure 3b, higher NfCC men experienced less body shame than did
lower NfCC men after exposure to complementary sexism (( !
".84, p % .001). NfCC did not moderate responses in the other
conditions: benevolent sexism (( ! .34, p ! .10), hostile sexism
(( ! ".35, p ! .08), or no sexism (( ! ".29, p ! .15).
Discussion
In Experiment 3, we found that individual differences in NfCC
moderated the effects of sexism. That is, a greater need to avoid
cognitive closure was associated with significantly less self-
surveillance and body shame for women who were exposed to be-
nevolent or complementary forms of sexism. Among men, a greater
need to attain cognitive closure was associated with less self-
surveillance and body shame following exposure to complementary
stereotypes only. Consistent with the primary epistemic motive as-
sumed to underlie system justification (Jost et al., 2003; Jost &
Hunyady, 2005; Kay et al., 2008; Stapel & Noordewier, in press),
higher NfCC participants appear to respond to the content of sexist
stereotypes in ways that ultimately reinforce and maintain gender
inequality in society.
However, NfCC was not found to moderate state self-
objectification. One possible explanation for this null result is that
NfCC influences the extent to which women commit personal
feelings and resources to fulfilling sexist beliefs, but it may not
change the influence of these beliefs on the self-concept as a
whole. That state self-objectification increased in response to
benevolent and complementary forms of sexism, however, is more
evidence that these sexist cues represent powerful environmental
stimuli that produce system-maintaining outcomes (see also Jost &
Kay, 2005). In sum, Experiment 3 provides new evidence to
Table 4



















Self-objectification 4.40a (7.37) 14.32b (6.95) 12.56b (6.48) 4.68a (6.58) "11.44c (8.93) "11.96c (7.20) "11.16c (9.65) "12.80c (10.42)
Self-surveillance 3.77a (0.45) 4.58b (1.29) 4.36b (0.99) 3.68a,c (0.44) 3.39d (0.58) 3.57a,c,d (0.65) 2.86e (0.89) 3.41c,d (0.84)
Body shame 3.43a (0.42) 4.22b (1.05) 4.38b (0.93) 3.24a (0.55) 3.11a,c (0.57) 2.94c (0.51) 2.81c (0.63) 3.00a,c (0.64)
Need for cognitive closure 3.54 (0.28) 3.56 (0.39) 3.65 (0.35) 3.65 (0.33) 3.69 (0.27) 3.76 (0.48) 3.71 (0.43) 3.64 (0.37)
Note. Means with different subscripts within rows differ significantly at p % .05.
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suggest that lower NfCC may afford women some protection
against self-surveillance and body shame in response to sexist
content that serves to justify the status quo and satisfy epistemic
needs for certainty and structure.
General Discussion
Ambivalent, complementary forms of sexism are particularly
insidious because of their dichotomized views of women. On one
hand, women are viewed extremely positively and cherished as the
keepers of purity, goodness, and nurturance. On the other hand,
these seemingly flattering views of women also cast them as weak,
inferior creatures in need of men’s protection and support. We
proposed that exposure to benevolent (and complementary) forms
of sexism would motivate women, but not men, to focus more
attention on their appearance in an effort to gain male approval and
conform to traditional sex roles and, in so doing, to maintain the
status quo (cf. Jost & Kay, 2005; Kilianski & Rudman, 1998; Lau
et al., 2008; Prentice & Carranza, 2002). In three experiments, we
found that incidental exposure to ideological content that legiti-
mizes existing gender relations (i.e., through benevolent and com-
plementary sexism) encourages women to adopt stereotypically
feminine self-perspectives while discouraging men from taking the
same self-perspectives (cf. Bem & Lenney, 1976).
The results from Experiment 2 also demonstrated that women’s
intentions, at least in the short-term, involved more plans and
Figure 2. Relation between self-surveillance and body shame with need
for cognitive closure as a function of type of sexism exposure in (a) women
and (b) men in Experiment 3.
Figure 3. Relation between self-surveillance and body shame with need
for cognitive closure as a function of type of sexism exposure in (a) women
and (b) men in Experiment 3.
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behaviors related to their appearance following exposure to benev-
olent and complementary forms of sexism. This was not the case
when women were exposed to hostile sexism or no sexism, or for
men overall. These findings are stunning given the nature of
stereotype activation (Wegner & Smart, 1997). That such a subtle
and inconspicuous reminder of prevalent sexist beliefs was suffi-
cient to activate planning with respect to the management of one’s
physical appearance reveals the depth of the system-justifying
effects of benevolent sexism.
This research provides the first experimental evidence that mere
reminders of benevolent sexism increase women’s intentions to
engage in a variety of appearance-management behaviors in the
immediate future. Because the purpose of this program of research
was to investigate the deleterious impact of sexist ideology on
self-objectification, we did not include dependent measures of
positive appearance-related emotions in these studies. It is possible
that exposure to system-justifying stereotypes may also trigger
certain positive appearance-related emotions, such as more body
appreciation or greater body esteem; this should be investigated in
future research before concluding that benevolent sexism triggers
only negative appearance-related outcomes. In addition, although
men’s self-objectification did not increase in response to our
manipulations, there are probably other consequences for men who
are exposed to benevolent sexism and other ideas that justify
traditional gender arrangements. For example, rather than focusing
on appearance, it is conceivable that men might focus on their
careers and on attaining financial security (or even prosperity), in
line with their societal role as primary breadwinner. Thus, future
studies in this area might address the effects of environmental
sexism on men’s concerns in other domains.
The richness of the ideological content examined in this re-
search also warrants further consideration. The benevolent sexism
items of the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory comprise three distinct
aspects: complementary gender differentiation, heterosexual inti-
macy, and paternalism. The four items we used to manipulate
benevolent sexism exposure in this research covered all three
dimensions. That is, our first and third items represented comple-
mentary gender differentiation, the second item represented het-
erosexual intimacy, and the fourth item represented paternalism.
Having established the impact of sexist ideology on women’s
self-objectification across three studies, some obvious next steps
would be to investigate the effects of more specific messages
embedded within the sexist content. For example, Cikara, Lee,
Fiske, and Glick (2009) have suggested that paternalism—the
belief that men must protect and provide for women—may be
essential to gaining women’s support for traditional gender ar-
rangements. Thus, in future research, investigators would do well
to isolate paternalistic messages from other contents to determine
which specific beliefs are necessary and sufficient for increasing
women’s degree of self-objectification.
In Experiment 3, we found that individual differences in NfCC
affected how participants responded to sexist cues. Consistent with
past theorizing (e.g., Kruglanski, 2006), higher NfCC was posi-
tively associated with the tendency to respond to the sexist content
in stereotype-confirming (i.e., system-justifying) ways for both
women and men (see Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Kruglanski & Web-
ster, 1996). Complementary sexist cues, which are especially ef-
fective at representing the existing system of gender relations as
fair and legitimate, led higher NfCC men to engage in less body
monitoring, thereby actively distancing themselves from the pre-
scriptive stereotypes associated with women. A different pattern
emerged for women: Self-surveillance and body shame were great-
est among higher NfCC women and weakest among lower NfCC
women following exposure to benevolent or complementary sex-
ism. These findings provide new evidence that lower NfCC, which
reflects a motivation to withhold judgment and avoid cognitive
closure, may protect women against the negative consequences of
benevolent sexism, which are otherwise difficult to resist (see
Dardenne et al., 2007; Jost & Kay, 2005).
It is possible that the processing of benevolent sexism may
require more cognitive effort from women, insofar as it cannot be
dismissed as readily as hostile sexism. In accordance with the
literature on stereotype threat (e.g., Schmader & Johns, 2003;
Steele & Aronson, 1995), benevolent sexism has been found to
reduce cognitive capacity among women by triggering mental
intrusions that reflect self-doubt and preoccupation (Dardenne et
al., 2007). Recent work suggests that people who are lower in
NfCC may be better able to attend to and process highly variable
social information (Kossowska, 2007). Thus, under conditions of
diminished cognitive capacity (e.g., following stereotype threat or
benevolent sexism exposure), it may be that the tendency to
prolong closure may help women to process and reconcile poten-
tially threatening but ambiguous social information, such as that
contained in benevolent and complementary sexism. Future studies
are needed to investigate the precise mechanisms by which NfCC
may perpetuate or protect against benevolent sexism and self-
objectification.
Our findings in the three experiments may be partially explained
by the notion that reminders of benevolent sexism threaten aspects
of women’s self-concepts (Dardenne et al., 2007; Davies, Spencer,
Quinn, & Gerhardstein, 2002). Drawing on research concerning
stereotype activation, stereotype threat, and minority disidentifica-
tion (Major, Spencer, Schmader, Wolfe, & Crocker, 1998; Nosek,
Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002; Steele, 1997), we suggest that rather
than inducing short-term disengagement and long-term disidenti-
fication from a stereotyped domain, subtly reminding women of
their inferior social status may foster short-term engagement and
long-term identification with socially valued aspects of femininity
as traditionally defined (Eagly, Wood, & Johannesen-Schmidt,
2004; Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997; Pratto & Walker, 2004).
According to Nosek, Banaji, and Greenwald (2002), the social
learning of gender roles influences individual preferences, abili-
ties, and behaviors:
For now, we can suggest that a fundamental categorization at birth
into the groups male or female produces identification with one’s
social group and that such identification shapes and is shaped by
experiences that are expected of that social group. From such expe-
riences flow preferences and performance that can be enhancing or
limiting insofar as they interfere with free access to modes of thinking
and choices that make for a fulfilling and productive life. (p. 57)
Insofar as appearance-management is a socially valued domain
for women, self-objectification might become temporarily (or
chronically) engaged in response to benevolent sexism because
women “perceive good prospects in the domain, that is, that one
has the interests, skills, resources, and opportunities to prosper
there, as well as that one belongs there, in the sense of being
accepted and valued in the domain” (Steele, 1997, p. 613).
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The present findings are also congruent with research on social
power. That is, by reminding women of their subordinate role to
men, the activation of benevolent and complementary sexism may
have primed women to feel more powerless and men to feel more
powerful. Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, and Gruenfeld (2006) found that
individuals who were primed to think about being powerless were
more likely to adopt other-focused perspectives, whereas individ-
uals who were primed to think about being powerful were more
likely to adopt more egocentric perspectives. Furthermore, Van der
Toorn et al. (2010) demonstrated in a series of experimental and
field studies that a sense of powerlessness increases system justi-
fication tendencies. Insofar as sexist ideology communicates in-
formation about gender differences in power, greater self-
objectification among women may be due in part to women taking
the male perspective and justifying the system more when feeling
powerless. Lower self-objectification among men may reflect that
they care even less about what other people think of them when
they are feeling powerful. Thus, power would appear to be a
critical variable to consider in future investigations of self-
objectification (e.g., Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, 2008).
This program of research builds on and extends objectification
theory (Calogero, Tantleff-Dunn, & Thompson, 2010; Fredrickson
& Roberts, 1997; Moradi & Huang, 2008) by providing the first
experimental evidence demonstrating that benevolent and comple-
mentary forms of sexism are potent environmental triggers of
self-objectification among women. We take this program of re-
search a step further by locating this work within a system justi-
fication framework. Self-objectification may be conceived of as
one consequence of dominant sexist ideologies that justify and
preserve the societal status quo by gaining the compliance of
women, despite the fact that gender inequality inflicts significant
costs upon girls and women as individuals and as a group (Jost &
Banaji, 1994; Jost & Kay, 2005; Jost et al., 2004). A chronic focus
on appearance could limit women from developing the skills and
competencies needed to improve their social status and occupy
better positions in society. Even when physical appearance is not
the most highly valued attribute, investment in appearance man-
agement competes for finite psychological and physical resources
that are required for academic and professional achievement and
healthy social interaction; it also requires a considerable financial
investment that can drain the average woman’s economic re-
sources (Tiggeman & Rothblum, 1997; Zones, 2000).
In many cases, then, self-surveillance and body shame can be
thought of as consequences of “system justification” or “internal-
ized oppression” that pressure women to assimilate to restricted
social roles and societal demands that are disproportionately thrust
upon women (see also Jost, 1995, 1997; Jost & Banaji, 1994;
Zones, 2000). In other words, the phenomenon we have identified
seems to be one in which “members of disadvantaged groups not
only pretend to accept their station in life, but actually do see
themselves through the dominant cultural lens” (Jost et al., 2002,
p. 589; see also Allport, 1954). By subtly triggering self-
objectification and related processes, benevolent sexism seems to
possess distinct ideological advantages over hostile sexism when it
comes to system maintenance (see also Bem & Bem, 1970; Glick
& Fiske, 2001; Jackman, 1994; Jost & Kay, 2005).
Consistent with Mary Wollstonecraft’s observation over two
centuries ago, we have provided new and direct evidence to
suggest that self-objectification is part and parcel of a broader
ideological network that maintains women’s subordinated status.
By incorporating theories of epistemic motivation (Kruglanksi,
2006) and system justification (Jost & Banaji, 1994), we have
highlighted both the psychological mechanisms and overarching
societal implications of self-objectification and its relation to sexist
stereotyping in general. In conclusion, although our data may not
definitively establish that self-objectification occurs as a direct
consequence of the need to justify and support the system of
gender inequality, it is clear from this set of findings that by
increasing self-objectification, encounters with benevolent and
complementary (i.e., system-justifying) forms of sexist stereotypes
do indeed encourage women’s active participation in their own
self-subjugation.
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